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PARTY IDENTIFICATION AND PARTY 
CLOSENESS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
Samuel H. Barnes, M. Kent Jennings, 
Ronald Inglehart, and Barbara Farah 
The present analysis uses data from 1974 and 1981 U. S. cross seetions, which incorporate 
a panel, to compare the standard NES measure of party identification (ID) with a measure 
of partisanship derived from a party closeness question widely employed in cross-national 
research. Important features of the two scales are examined by transforming the closeness 
measure into a scale of very close, fairly close, not very close, and no preference 
corresponding to the seven-point ID scale. The scales are highly correlated and are similar 
in their reliability. More than 75% of the "independents" in the ID scale choose a party in 
the closeness version, and over half of these select the "fairly close" category. Respondents 
do not volunteer that they are independents when that alternative is not stated in the 
question, 
Tile conceptualization and measurement of partisanship have generated 
an enduring controversy in the study of electoral behavior. The issues are 
complicated in a single country; complexities multiply in a cross-national 
context. This article explores two measures of partisanship employed in two 
U. S. cross sections and a panel study: One is the traditional party 
identification (ID) measure associated with the University of Michigan 
electoral school; the other is a party closeness measure widely employed in 
European and comparative studies. We document both sinailarities and 
differences in the measures. We examine the political complexion of the 
electorate according to the two measures and pay particular attention to the 
differing images of partisanship and independence that they evoke. Finally, 
we explore how the two measures relate to other attitudes and behaviors, 
especially the vote. 
Most research on American politics uses the ID measure developed and 
employed in the University of Michigan's electoral studies. It has proven to 
Samuel H. Barnes, M. Kent Jennings, and Ronald Inglehart, The University of Michigan. 
Barbara Farah, The New "fork Times. Address correspondence to: Dr. Samuel H. Bm'nes, 4010 
Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48106. 
Political Behavior © 1988 Agathon Press, Inc. Vol. 1O, No. 3 
215 
216 BARNES ET AL. 
have utility and durability in the study of electoral behavior and political 
parties. Yet many aspects of the measurement remain controversial, 
including in particular the question of partisan versus independent 
identification. Some say the two identifications are not incompatible, 
because they tap separate dimensions (Dennis, 1981a, b, 1982; Kamieniecki, 
1985; Weisberg, 1980). Others note that the pure independent category 
combines citizens who are politically engaged yet reluctant to name a party 
with others who are in fact nonpartisan or even apolitical (Miller and 
Wattenberg, 1983; Craig, 1985), Intransitivities exist in the ID measure: 
Patterns of relationships with other variables suggest that many indepen- 
dents are actually more partisan than weak identifiers (Petrocik, 1974; 
Bastedo and Lodge, 1980; Campbell, 1984; Keith, Magleby, Nelson, Orr, 
Westlye, and Wolfinger, 1986; Valentine and van Wingen, 1980). Students 
of cross-national electoral behavior claim that the phenomenon of 
independence is confined to the United States (Budge, Crewe, and Farlie, 
eds., 1976). 
The present analysis introduces party closeness as an alternative measure 
of partisanship and compares it with ID. Although the marginals generated 
by the two measures do not differ greatly, party closeness has some 
important advantages. It resolves many of the problems associated with 
independence in American electoral research. It elicits a spontaneous 
partisan preference from a higher percentage of respondents than does ID. 
It clarifies the distinctions between partisans and apoliticals. The closeness 
measure aligns respondents along a seven-point scale as in the ID version, 
but with fewer of the intransitivities exhibited by the latter. Party closeness 
possesses the high reliability of the ID measure. The closeness measure is 
clearly superior for cross-national comparisons, as the ID measure is 
difficult to administer in multiparty systems. When the party closeness 
measure is used, many "independents" on the ID scale spontaneously name 
a party; they do not volunteer that they are independents when that 
alternative is not presented to them. 
The alternative measure helps clarify the meaning and consequences 
attached to the usage of the traditional measure. The face content of the 
measures suggests that the two may tap somewhat different qualities. One 
captures closeness to a party, which may be quite different from feeling 
oneself a partisan of that party, of "being" a Democrat or a Republican. 
They offer somewhat different profiles of the partisan landscape. 
Nevertheless, except for analyses focusing on the nature of "'independence," 
the two measures are for most purposes interchangeable. This conclusion is 
reassuring to comparative scholars who have relied on the ID measure for 
estimating partisanship in the United States. 
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THE TWO MEASURES OF PARTISANSHIP 
In the University of Michigan's CPS/NES electoral studies, the 
respondent is asked, "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself 
as a Republican, a Democrat, an independent, or what?" Those naming a 
party are asked, "Would you call yourself a "strong" (Republican/Democrat) 
or a "not very strong" (Republican/Democrat)? Independents or "other" are 
asked, "Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic 
party?" The format provides the respondent with the names of the two 
major parties and also suggests "independent" as an equally acceptable 
alternative. 
Questions used to elicit partisan preference in other countries do not 
suggest independence as an alternative, and they seldom name the parties. 
Party closeness is one of these widely used alternative measures of 
partisanship. It has been used by Michigan scholars in a series of foreign 
surveys, by other researchers in several countries, and in an eight-nation 
study of political action in the mid-1970s 1 In three of the eight countries 
included in the political action projec t - the  United States, Germany, and 
the Netherlands-a second survey, incorporating a panel, was executed in 
1979-1981. The present analysis focuses on the American data from these 
studies, as both the party closeness and ID questions were asked in both 
years. 2 
The party closeness question asked respondents, "Which political party 
do you usually feel closest to? ''3 Those who name a party are then asked, 
"'Would you say you feel very close, fairly close, or not very close to that 
party?" The resulting fourfold distributions (ignoring party designation) of 
the American cross-section samples for the two years are given in Table 1. 
The parallel distributions for the ID scales are given in Table 2. 
Several aspects of these marginals merit emphasis. The apparent number 
of (spontaneous) partisans varies dramatically between the two measures. 
Fewer than one-fifth of the respondents failed to select a party in the 
closeness version even though parties were not named; a corollary is that 
respondents did not volunteer "independent" when that stimulus was not 
provided. By contrast, two-fifths of the samples failed to select a par~ 
without further prompting in the ID format. The partisan landscape looks 
TABLE 1. Fourfold Distributions of the American Cross-Section Samples 
Total with 
Very Fairly Not V e r y  Unprompted No 
close Close C l o s e  Pre fe rences  Preferences 
1974 14.1% 41.6% 28.1% 83.8% 16.2% 
1981 14.5 47.7 24.0 86.2 13.8 
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TABLE 2. Parallel Distributions for the ID Scales 
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No 
Total with Total  Preference 
Strong Weak Unprompted Independent with & Pure 
Partisans Partisans Preferences Leaners  Preferences Independent 
1974 2 2 . 9 %  36.7% 59.6% 21.9% 81.5% 18.5% 
1981 25.1 34.3 59.4 28.3 87.7 12.3 
quite different when viewed through these two lenses: It is one thing to say" 
that two-fifths of the American public has no party preference and quite 
another to say that less than one-fifth does. 
Some respondents may have been encouraged to claim a party in the 
closeness version by tile fact that they were not immediately reminded that 
they could use independent or "no party" as an alternative; others may have 
recalled that they had previously been asked the ID questions in the same 
interview. But why would so many have remembered that they had 
selected a party, yet so few have recalled that they had responded 
"independent" to that question? In its current format, the closeness 
question does not distinguish between "independent" and "no partisan 
preference" responses. But even if all of those in category four of the 
closeness measure considered themselves to be pure independents, which 
is highly unlikely, the percentage of independents could be only a bit more 
than one-third of that in the ID measure. 
Question placement does not account for these differences. Schuman and 
Presser (1981, p. 54) found that fatigue, which may ensue near the end of a 
long interview, often reduces substantive responses. Two pieces of evidence 
suggest that question placement and ~htigue are not responsible for the 
differences between the two measures. The first is that the closeness 
question came at the very end of the interview, while ID was asked near the 
midway point. Yet in 1974, there were slightly fewer instances of "no 
preference" in the closeness scale compared with pure independence on the 
ID measure, with the situation being reversed in 1981. The second piece of 
evidence concerns the length of the interviews. Dividing interviews into 
three groups according to length of interview shows no fatigue effects in the 
longer interviews. In 1974, interview length had no impact at all on the 
percentage of identifiers. In 1981, the group with the longest intelwiews had 
7% more identifiers than the shortest. This was largely accounted for by the 
greater length of Republican intelwiews in that year. 4 
If the traditional measure generates seemingly fewer outright partisans 
than does the closeness measure, it nevertheless produces higher 
proportions of intense partisans. Whereas about one in four of the total set 
of respondents in each year is classified as a strong Democrat or Republican 
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in the traditional measure, only about one in six is classified "very dose" in 
the alternative measure. As many studies have demonstrated, such intense 
partisans are a special breed; the closeness version understates their 
presence. Perhaps this is in part due to partisans being presented with three 
alternatives in the closeness version and only two (strong and not very 
strong) in the ID one. 
The characteristics of each measure are constant at both points in time. 
That such similar overall results were obtained across the seven years 
indicates that these similarities and differences are inherent in the measures 
rather than being the reflection of peculiar circumstances. 
SIMILARITIES IN THE TWO MEASURES 
What difference does it make whether one or the other measure is used? 
To examine this question we need to render the categories of the two 
measures comparable. We accomplish this by arranging the respondents on 
the closeness scale from very close Democrat to very close Republican, with 
those without a partisan prei~rence at the midpoint. 5 Remember that the 
three categories of closeness were solicited after the respondent had 
indicated a feeling of closeness to a party, so that the "not very close" 
category consists of respondents who said they felt "dose" to a party, but 
who chose "not very close" rather than "very close" or "fairly dose" on the 
follow-up question. This seven-point scale parallels the seven-point ID scale 
ranging from strong Democrat to strong Republican with pure indepen- 
dents at the midpoint, as follows: 
t 2 3 4 5 6 7 
ID Strong Weak Ind. Ind. & Ind. W e a k  Strong 
Dem. D e m .  Dem. no pref. Rep. Rep. Rep. 
Closeness Very Fairly Not No Not Fairly Very 
close close close preL close close close 
Dem. D e m .  Dem. Rep. Rep. Rep. 
The marginals for the two scales in the 1974 and 1981 cross sections are 
given in Table 3. 8 Now the two measures resemble each other to a far 
greater extent. The leaners of the ID scale have been made to parallel the 
not-close partisans of the other scale. As could be inferred from previous 
observations, perhaps the most significant contrast lies in the presence of 
more intense devotees of each party according to the traditional measure. 
Congruence of the measures at the aggregate level does not necessarily 
mean congruence at the individual level. In fact, however, there is a high 
individual-level correspondence between these two measures at both points 
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TABLE 3. Marginais for the Two Scales in the 1974 and 1981 Cross Sections 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1974 ID 16% 23% 14% 18% 7% 14% 7% 
1974 Closeness 10 27 18 16 10 15 4 
19811D 13 21 15 12 13 14 12 
1981 Closeness 8 25 15 14 9 22 7 
in time. The product moment correlation (r) between the two was 0.85 in 
1974 and 0.88 in 1981--strong evidence for their overlap. Other approaches 
also show the overlap. For example, if leaners are included in the partisan 
groupings, very few instances of inconsistent classifications emerge; thus, in 
1974, only 2.7% of the respondents were Republicans on one scale and 
Democrats on the other, or vice versa, while in 1981, the figure was 2.3%. 
The two scales are also comparable in their stability over time. Asher 
(1974) found a 0.83 product moment correlation for the ID measure in the 
1956-1960 NES panel; Jennings and Markus (1984) report a coefficient of 
0.78 for a 1965-1973 panel of parents, a 0.83 correlation for these parents 
between 1973-1982, and a 0.77 correlation over the entire seventeen-year 
period. In the present panel, the product moment stability coefficient of the 
ID measure is 0.72. The closeness measure is ahnost as stable, at 0.71. (See 
also Converse and Markus, 1979, p. 38; Markus, 1982, p. 549.) 
Another measure of stability is the percentage of respondents who 
possess the same party preference at the two points in time. Summary 
measures of those in the panel with stable preferences (including leaners)-- 
the percentage Democratic, no preference, or Republican at both points in 
time, regardless of intensity--are given in Table 4. 
Similarity in the intergenerational transfer of partisanship provides 
additional evidence of the overlap between the two scales. Party 
identification has traditionally been one of the most faithfully transmitted of 
all political attitudes (Jennings and Niemi, 1974, 1981). The 1974 study 
contained interviews with 245 pairs of parents and their offspring, of whom 
226 gave valid answers for both of the partisanship questions. 7 The pair 
correlations (r) for the two measures were quite similar: 0.48 for the 
closeness measure and 0.54 for ID. Considering that the closeness version 
TABLE 4. Preference Percentages at Both Points in Time 
Total 
Democrats No Pref .  Republicans Stable Unstable 
ID 41.9% 6.8% 26.4% 75.1% 24.9% 
Closeness 44.4 5.2 25.9 75.5 24.5 
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relies on spontaneous party declaration and that the young have had little 
direct experience with the parties, the similarity in transmission rates is all 
the more impressive. The correlation between the two measures was 0.89 
for parents and 0,84 for children. 
A traditional strength of the standard measure is its ability to "predict" 
the vote, though exceptions are not uncommon (see below). Panel data on 
both measures permit the comparison of their predictive ability. Indeed, 
the six-year lag between reported party preference in 1974 and presidential 
vote in 1980 constitutes a stern test of the strength of subjective party 
attachment measures. The two scales are remarkably similar in their results: 
The following are the panel percentages of each category from the first wave 
that reported in the second wave that they voted for the Republican 
candidate in 1980: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
ID 23% 46% 58% 73% 87% 92% 97% 
Closeness 22 45 53 75 89 94 100 
Overall, then, the two scales are equivalent in many aspects of the 
assessment of the direction and the intensity of partisanship. 
THE QUESTION OF INDEPENDENCE 
If the measures behave similarly despite their different origins, why 
should a new approach be preferred over a tried-and-true friend? What are 
the advantages of the alternative measure? One is that the closeness 
measure deals better with several problems arising from the ID treatment 
of independence. 
The closeness measure links most respondents with a political party. If it 
does so improperly--if it classifies people as partisan who in fact are not-- 
the measure would be flawed. There is no evidence that this is the case. 
Party closeness provides empirical results quite similar to ID. The 
alternative measure holds up well under close scrutiny. In particular, it 
eliminates some problems arising from the treatment of independents in the 
ID scale. The cross-tabulations of the closeness and ID scales for 1974 and 
for 1981 suggest the origins of some of these problems with independents 
(see Table 5). 
Independent leaners are found in all categories of intensiW in the 
closeness scale, and are slightly more likely to be found in the "fairly close'" 
category than in the "not very close" category, the one that corresponds to 
the teaners in the ID scale, s Respondents may value independence highly, 
yet not find it difficult to choose a party they are close to--and often quite 
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TABLE 5. Closeness and ID Scales, 1974 and 1981 (in % of Total Cross Sections, 
Age ~ 18) 
1974 
Closeness 
ID VCD FCD NCD NPr NCR FCR VCR % N = 
SD 8.0% 7.3 1.0 .1 0. .3 .1 16.7 260 
WD 1.3 11.2 8.9 .9 .3 .5 ,1 23.2 362 
ID .8 6.8 5.1 1.2 .3 .1 0. 14,3 223 
IND .1 1.3 2,4 12.2 .9 .6 .1 17.6 274 
IR 0, .1 .4 1.2 2.3 3.0 .1 7.1 111 
WR 0. ,2 .4 .6 5.5 6.9 .7 14.3 223 
SR 0. 0. 0. 0. .2 3.5 3.1 6.7 105 
Total 10.3 27.0 18.2 16.0 9.5 14.9 4.1 100% 
N= 160 420 284 250 148 232 64 1558 
1981 
SD 5.9 6.3 1.0 .2 0. 0. 0. 13.4 144 
WD 1.1 11.2 7.2 .9 .1 .5 0. 20.9 225 
ID .4 7.2 5.5 1.4 .3 .3 0. 15.0 161 
IND .2 .6 .8 8.8 .8 . 1 0. 11.3 121 
IR 0. . 1 .6 1.7 3.3 7.1 ,6 13.2 142 
WR ,3 .1 .1 .6 3.9 8.2 .7 13.9 149 
SR 0. 0. .1 .2 .4 6.3 5.3 12.3 132 
Total 7.8 25.4 15.3 13.7 8.8 22.4 6.6 100% 
N= 84 273 164 147 94 241 71 1074 
VC=very close; FC= fairty close; NC=not close; S=strong; W=weak; I=independent. 
close to - -when  asked! This ambiguity helps explain the frequently observed 
irregularities on the part  of independent  leaners. The standard I D  measure 
allocates them to a less intense state of party attachment than they actually 
claim when queried in a different fashion. 
Comparison of the closeness and ID  measures can thus help resolve some 
puzzles about the workings of the standard measure. In particular, 
comparison can also provide insights on several speculations about the 
nature of independence in American electoral behavior and party politics 
and the presumed contrasts between the American setting and those of 
Western Europe.  
One insight concerns the distinction between independents,  including 
leaners, and no preference respondents. Coding procedures used in the 
1981 American study permit  a distinction between the two categories. 9 The 
partisan division on the closeness scale of independents and no-preference 
respondents from the ID  scale in 1981 is given in Table 6. Not surprisingly, 
the no-preference respondents are highly clustered toward the center of the 
closeness scale, 
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TABt~E 6. Partisan Division on the Closeness Scale of Independents and No 
Preference Respondents from the ID Scale in 1981 
Very Fairly Not Not Fair ly Very 
Close Close Close No Close Close Close 
Dem. Dem.  Dem.  Choice Rep. Rep. Rep. N 
Independents 
(including 
leaners) 1% 22% 19% 23% 11% 22% 1% (328) 
No preference 1 11 13 54 12 7 1 (97) 
The same is not so with respect to the independents. Some 77% of the 
respondents who claim independence rather than no preference or a party 
in the ID question in fact choose a party in the closeness version. They are 
more likely to choose the fairly close than the not-close categories. The label 
of independent may be attractive, but respondents do not volunteer it 
unless it is specifically presented as an alternative. And they do not 
volunteer it even after independent has been mentioned in the interview 
schedule as an alternative equal to Republican or Democrat. Almost half of 
these independents are in the two most partisan categories in the closeness 
version, while the constraints of coding limit them to the category of leaner, 
at best, in the ID version. 
The above properties of independence in the ID scale are closely related 
to questions concerning intransitivities raised in connection with that 
measure. These intransitivities refer to nonmonotonic patterns in which 
many respondents who score high on partisanship according to the ID 
measure exhibit behaviors and attitudes that seem to reflect weaker 
partisanship than those who score lower. Using pooled data from the 
1952-1972 NES surveys, Petrocik (1974, p. 32) found several intransitivities 
in political involvement between leaners and weak identifiers, but no 
intransitivities in partisan-related behavior: Leaners were "less likely to 
vote a straight ballot and less likely to feel strongly about one party over the 
other than are identifiers; but they are higher than weak identifiers on all 
other measures of political involvement." During the time periods covered 
by the present study, even the strictly partisan variables exhibit some 
intransitivities in the ID but not in the closeness measures. 
Valentine and van Wingen (1980) found similar patterns of intransitivities. 
They noted that on measures relating strictly to partisanship, such as the 
attitudes of Democrats toward Democrats and Republicans toward 
Republicans, independent leaners are always less supportive of their party 
than are weak partisans. They also showed, howeve.r, that leaners were 
higher than weak partisans on general types of political predispositions such 
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as political efficacy, interest in politics, and attempts to influence the vote of 
others, just as Petrocik had reported. 
The ID scale exhibits some intransitivities in voting behavior. The 
Republican percentage of the two-party vote for president in 1972 (for the 
1974 cross section) and in 1980 (for the 1981 cross section) for each category 
on the two scales is given in Table 7.1° An intransitivity appears in the 
first-wave results for ID: A higher percentage of weak than leaning 
Democrats reported voting for Nixon in 1972. The closeness scale, by 
contrast, shows no intransitivities. Moreover, it "spreads" the voters across 
a wider range of variation than does the standard measureA 1 
The Republican and Democratic party thermometers exhibit patterns 
similar to voting: There are no intransitivities in the party thermometer  
scores on the closeness scales, whereas the ID measure shows that weak 
Democrats felt more warmly than leaning Democrats toward the 
Republican party in both years and weak Republicans showed greater 
affection than leaning Republicans for Democrats in 1981. Thus, on these 
variables, our ID scales exhibit the predicted intransitivities; the closeness 
scales show far fewer. 12 Petrocik attributed these intransitivities, in part, to 
the higher educational levels of independents, which is quite compatible 
with the results found by Valentine and van Wingen as well as our own. 
This explanation undoubtedly accounts for some intransitivities, such as 
efficacy. But another source is certainly the inclusion of partisanship and 
independence in the same scale; the party closeness measure exhibits far 
fewer intransitivities on the dimensions examined. 
A MEASURE OF "SUPPORT" 
A short detour will consider the treatment of independence in another 
recent approach to the measurement of party preference. The 1980 NES 
developed a "support scale" as a new measure of partisanship that promised 
to resolve some of the nagging problems concerning the dimensionality of 
the ID measure. Individuals in the present study cannot be located on the 
TABLE 7. Republican Percentage of the Two-Party Vote for President in 1972 and 
in 1980 for Each Category on the Two Scales 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1972 ID 26% 55% 49% 76% 92% 98% 99% 
1972 Closeness 19 47 59 77 96 96 100 
1980 ID 13 35 47 81 92 95 98 
1980 Closeness 8 33 42 78 91 98 98 
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support measure, as it was not included in the qnestionnaire; but it is 
possible to profit from a comparison of the marginals. 
The battery introduced in the 1980 NES study asked, "In you own mind, 
do you think of yourself as a supporter of one of the political parties, or not? 
(If yes,) which political party do you support?" Almost 60% of the 1980 
sample responded no, and they were asked, "Do you ever think of yourself 
as closer to one of the maior political parties, or not? (If yes,) Here is a scale 
from 1 to 7 where 1 means feeling very close to the Republican party and 7 
means feeling very close to the Democratic party. Where would you place 
yourself on this scale? ''la The marginal frequencies are as follows: 14 
Democratic Closer to Not closer Closer to Republican 
supporter Democratic to a party Republican supporter 
party party 
23.9% 16.0% 33.3% 10.1% 16.7% 
The most serious consequence of this hybrid measure of party support 
and closeness is that one-third of the sample ends up without any partisan 
assigmnent at all. This is double the percentage of pure independents in the 
ID scale from the 1980 NES and more than double the percentage in the 
no-preference categories in the 1974 and 1981 closeness scales. Unless those 
without a partisan preference turn out to be devoid of any feeling of 
closeness to either party-which cannot be true given their willingness to 
make a choice on the traditional ID measure in the same interview 
schedule--the support question understates the level of partisanship. It 
may be desirable to screen out respondents without true opinions; but it is 
also possible that asking first about being a pal~y supporter and then 
providing a midpoint on a seven-point scale makes it too easy for 
respondents to remain neutral. 
The support measm'e avoids the problem of independents but creates 
new ones by discouraging professions of partisan direction. On the other 
hand, the ID cues of Democrat, Republican, or independent confuse two 
dimensions. The closeness measure possesses advantages in dealing with 
both problems. 
The previous discussion has underlined a central tenet of survey research: 
Question wording makes a difference. This is a special concern in 
cross-national work. A review of problems of comparability in cross-national 
research is not necessary here. Nevertheless, a few comments will illustrate 
some dimensions of the problem as they affect the two measures of 
partisanship. 
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A CROSS-NATIONAL COMPARISON 
The differing results of the three measures already discussed underline 
the importance of question wording. 15 Yet comparisons between the United 
States and other countries often ignore differences in how partisanship is 
gauged. Independence is a serious problem. Cross-national comparisons 
show that, when the party closeness measure is used, respondents in the 
United States are no less likely than those of its peer democracies to choose 
a party rather than independence. Cross-national results with the party 
closeness scale suggest that national levels of identification with parties are 
very much a function of the length of experience with democratic elections, 
as Converse (1969) argued. In the political action surveys of 1974-75, the six 
countries that used the closeness measure exhibited the following 
percentages expressing a partisan preference: ~6 
Netherlands U,S. Finland Britain I ta ly Switzerland 
83% 82% 82% 8 t% 73% 59% 
The high absolute levels and the similarity among the four countries that 
have a long, largely unbroken history of free elections with universal 
suffrage are remarkable. By the same token, the lower percentages in Italy 
and Switzerland are also explicable in terms of each country's political 
history, x7 
The introduction of independence into cross-national comparisons gives 
rise to complications. Only in the United States is the phenomenon 
widespread, is Europeans, Canadians, and others drift into and out of 
partisanship and no preference; they do not claim to be independents. But 
then neither do Americans when they are not explicitly offered that choicer 
This is not to argue that independence is not widespread in the United 
States, or that it should not be taken into account in comparing Americans 
with citizens of other countries. Rather, it is a separate dimension that 
merits separate investigation. Cross-national analyses that rely on ID 
measures in the United States and closeness measures in other countries 
cannot deal properly with questions concerning independence and 
nonpartisanship. Independence is an American phenomenon. It is 
undoubtedly real, encouraged by registration requirements, and decades if 
not generations of public discussion. We do not argue that it is purely an 
artifact of measurement. On the other hand, when Americans are asked the 
same questions about partisanship that are asked of citizens of most other 
countries, as in the closeness question, their responses are remarkably 
similar to those of other countries. 
We really don't know much about independence in other countries. 
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Judging from the electoral laws mad public debate outside the United 
States, there are few reasons for expecting the phenomenon to be 
widespread--at least in its American form. It seems tied closely with the ID 
question for eliciting partisanship. No assumptions about independence 
should be made when other measures such as the party closeness measure 
are employed. Cross-national speculation should take into account the 
results of alternative wording in evaluating partisanship in the United 
States. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Party closeness is similar to ID in many ways. It shares the high reliability 
of ID, meaning that it is one of the most reliable scales in survey research 
dealing with political behavior. It divides respondents into categories in 
roughly the same manner as ID. In its relationship with many other 
variables it seems to behave quite similarly to ID. By most behavioral 
criteria the two scales are quite parallel. 
The ID measure is one of the treasures of American electoral research. 
Why then employ the closeness measure instead of the long-used traditional 
scale? The closeness measure resolves some important irregularities 
accompanying the ID measure. It taps a single dimension of partisanship 
and thus eliminates most of the problems associated with independence, 
which our analyses suggest is a separate dimension. The closeness measure 
is especially suitable for cross-national comparisons, an advantage that 
perhaps carries greater weight with comparativists than with Americmaists. 
The ID measure is unsuitable for use in countries with more than two 
parties, which means it is unsuitable everywhere except the United States. 
It is also unsuitable where independence is not a part of the political 
vocabulary, which likewise means evelwwhere except the United States. In 
trying to understand partisanship in its rich diversity, researchers can take 
comfo~ in the finding that ID and closeness can, for most purposes, despite 
the differences in the resulting partisau profiles, be substituted for one 
another as long as the problem of independence is not at isstle. 
The closeness scale should be used as an alternative or supplement to ID 
in some American work, This would ensure that the results reported here 
are not idiosyncratic to this particular set of studies. It would also facilitate 
the development of comparability in cross-national electoral studies. 
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NOTES 
1. For example, Warren Miller employed the closeness measure in Swedish and Dutch, Philip 
Converse and Roy Pierce in French, and Samuel H. Barnes in Italian surveys in the 1960s. 
See Miller and Stouthard (1975), Barnes (1977), and Converse and Pierce (1986). The results 
of the first wave of the eight-nation surveys are reported in Barnes, Kaase, et al. (1979), for 
the United States, Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, and Austria. 
2. Unless clearly noted, all data presented in the present analysis come from these two cross 
sections (1974 and 1981) and the accompanying panel, The 1974 data are available from the 
Zentralarchiv (ZA) and the ICPSR (study number 7777). Tile 1981 cross section and panel 
data are being prepared for release by the ZA and will be av~ilable fi'om the ZA and the 
ICPSR. 
Both cross sections include respondents age 16 and above. The cross section N's for the 
United States are 1,719 in 1974 and 1,156 in 1981. The panel N is 933. Unless stated 
otherwise, in all of the analyses that follow, 16- and 17-year-olds have been eliminated from 
the cross sections in order to render the results comparable to NES data. Hence the 
reduced N's are 1,651 for 1974 and 1,122 for 1981. 
3. German and Austrian versions differ from the measure discussed here for reasons 
extraneous to the present discussion. 
4. Experimentation with placement and inclusion and exclusion of the two questions in 
different versions of the interview schedule would, of course, be the ideal solution to the 
types of problems being addressed here. The present design does not meet the criteria of 
a true experimental design. Yet it is clear that the ability of the closeness question to elicit 
partisanship is not due to "training" effects in the questionnaire, as the ID version was 
preceded by several very "political" questions, including the good and bad points of the 
parties and the meaning of left and right in politics; the closeness question, on the other 
hand, follows a series of demographic questlons--a format unlikely to have the same 
training effect. Placement effects seem to be minimal. 
5. This is not possible in multiparty systems or even in those such as Britain and Germany 
where the existence of minor parties complicates what is often viewed, incorrectly, as 
two-party electoral situations. 
6. The large percentage of Republican respondents in 1981 in both scales reflects the closeness 
of the interviewing to the Reagan landslide. Other surveys during this period detected the 
same surge. 
7. When the parent of a child 16-20 fell into the cross-sectional sample, the child was also 
interviewed, while a parent of each sample respondent 16-20 was likewise interviewed. See 
Jennings, Allerbeck, and Rosenmayr, 1979. 
8. Experimental research suggests several measurement effects that could play a role here 
(Schuman and Presser, 1981, pp. 54, 177). One is the tendency of respondents to choose 
moderate response categories when they are tired. Another is the preference of respon- 
dents for the middle category when confi'onted by three choices (very, close, fairly close, and 
not very close) rather than by strong or not very strong--the alternatives presented by" the 
ID version. Both may have had an impact on the responses, 
9. For a full discussion of this issue see Miller and Wattenberg (1983) and Craig (1985). These 
coding distinctions are available only in the original American data set; they were not 
included in the three-nation set of common-core questions that are available for distribution 
through the Zentralarchiv and the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social 
Research. 
10. Respondents who were too young to vote in 1972 and 1980 are excluded from the analyses. 
11. The closeness measure does not appear to be simply a surrogate for the vote, given the time 
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lag between reported vote and declaration of party attachment-the 1974 interviews 
followed the 1972 election by at least twenty months, while the 1981 lag was at least eight 
months-though it is possible that closeness is more responsive to short-term fin'ces than is 
ID. 
12. For example, both the strong identifiers and leaners are higher in political interest than 
weak identifiers in the ID scale, but not in the closeness version. On e~cacy, the ID scale 
shows leaners higher in both years; the closeness version shows weak identifiers higher than 
leaners. But in both versions, the lowest efficacy scores belong to strong Democrats and the 
highest to strong Republicans. Differences in education obviously enter here. Results for 
the ID scale on attempts to influence the vote of others parallel those of Valentine and van 
Wingen for Democrats in 1974 and for Republic~uas in 1981; the closeness scale shows no 
intransitivities on this variable. 
13. In the 1982 version the fi)llow-up question simply asked, "Do you ever think of yourself as 
closer to one of the two major parties, or not? (If yes,) Which party do yon feel closer to?" 
14. These figures are from Weisberg (1983, p. 365); see also Weisberg (1980) and Dennis (1982). 
Respondents were also asked, "Do you ever think of yourself as a political independent, or 
not?" With the responses to this question, respondents can be placed in a ten-eategoL'y 
classificatiou according to their response to this question combined with the above five 
categories (Weisberg, 1983, p. 365). However, this measure and the separate treatment of 
independence made possible by the new measures are not the concern of the present 
article. The data are available from the 1980 NES: ICPSR 7,763. 
15. For an example of differences of a similar magnitude in results obtained in Germany due to 
question wording, see Kaase, 1976. 
16. These figures are from the Political Action Cookbook (1979), 
17. Swiss women received the vote at the national level only three years heft)re the survey was 
taken. Italy, of course, suffered twenty years of dictatorship. 
18. A review of the literature revealed only one example of the use of the American ID version, 
including independent as an alternative, in non-American field work. Butler and Stokes 
(1969) report that a Gallup Poll in August 1966 asked "Conservative, Labor, Liberal, or 
independent," with only 3% chuosing the latter category. 
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